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Researchers show a booby-trapped repo could escape Claude Code's sandbox with no prompt

Accomplish disclosed "Beltdown," a chain of git config quirks that let an untrusted repository run commands outside Claude Code's macOS sandbox, and says Anthropic took roughly 50 days and 30 releases to fully fix it.

Stealth security startup Accomplish published a disclosure on September 11, 2026 for a vulnerability it calls "Beltdown": opening an untrusted repository in Claude Code could let that repo execute commands on the user's Mac outside the tool's sandbox, without triggering a permission prompt. Principal security researcher Oren Yomtov, who wrote the disclosure, said a command from the repo ran "outside the sandbox, with no permission prompt." Accomplish reported the bug to Anthropic on July 13, 2026. A partial hardening shipped August 6 in version 2.1.223, which Accomplish says was incomplete, and the full fix landed in version 2.1.247 on August 26.

How the chain works

Beltdown is five issues stacked together:

  • git's core.fsmonitor setting can be configured to execute an arbitrary shell command during routine repository operations.
  • Claude Code runs git commands outside its sandboxed Bash tool, unlike other commands it executes.
  • A git ls-files call the harness runs wasn't hardened against that config option.
  • Nested .git folders can be created and renamed to dodge protections that only checked root-level .git directories.
  • The agent's skill auto-loading feature triggers the automatic file-index refresh that sets off the chain.

Anthropic's fix blanks the core.fsmonitor setting on every git command Claude Code runs.

Three vendors, three disclosures

Accomplish also flagged sandbox-escape issues in OpenAI's Codex and in Cursor. Alex Konrad's account at Upstarts Media says Cursor and OpenAI shipped fixes in about a week each, against the roughly 50 days and 30 releases Accomplish says Anthropic needed to close Beltdown. Accomplish co-founder Or Hiltch asks why, if the labs' models are as capable as claimed, those models aren't catching critical vulnerabilities in the labs' own coding-agent products before outside researchers do.

If your developers run Claude Code, confirm they're on 2.1.247 or later, and treat any untrusted repository as untrusted code before opening it in a coding agent.

Sources

In this story: Claude Code, Claude

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